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THE RELATION BETWEEN
AMERICAN CHOICE OF LAW
AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW
DONALD T. TRAUTMAN*
INTRODUCTION
The current literature on choice of law offers an abundance of new "ap-
proaches" to explain and give structure to the now fairly widespread rejection
by courts of the simple and rigid systematics of Professor Beale and his 1934
Restatement of Conflict of Laws. My own efforts, largely in association with
my colleague Arthur von Mehren,1 have led me to think that one of the cen-
tral issues is the basic premise which we all-Professor Beale2 as well as those
who follow-have been using. That premise is that the problem is one of
conflict or choice between or among the competing rules and policies of co-
ordinate jurisdictions, states or nations. In what follows, I propose a substitute
for that premise and suggest what I hope is a more constructive way of stat-
ing the problem.
As I shall attempt to state more precisely at a later point in this paper, the
proposal is that a more congenial approach might be to ask whether a normal
substantive-law rule exists, one widely shared in the legal world to which the
concerned jurisdictions (including the forum) belong, and whether the
policies of particular concerned jurisdictions with views departing from that
norm are strong enough and relevant enough to justify application of their
divergent views in the particular case. Although I am not clear that there
* Professor, Harvard University Law School.
1. Our joint views were first brought together in A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF
MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965) [hereinafter cited as VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN.] For subsequent
individual writings see, e.g., von Mehren, Comment: Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems:
Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV. 347 (1974);
von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927 (1975); Traut-
man, Kell v. Henderson: A Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 465 (1967); Trautman, Comment on Reich v.
Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 618 (1968); Trautman, Rule or Reason in Choice of Law: A Comment on
Neumeier, 1 VT. L. REV. 1 (1976).
2. Professor Beale opted for "Conflict of Laws" on a pragmatic basis. "To be accurate the
term must be long and clumsy; inexcusable vices in a proper name. . . . In this dilemma we
choose the term which came first into use, and was made familiar to Anglo-American ears by
Story's great book, and by the later works of Wharton, Dicey, and Minor. One can do no better,
in explaining his choice of this title, than quote the wise and witty words of Vareilles-Sommibres.
[Footnotes omitted.] 'The warlike expression "Conflict of Laws" is used to describe the pacific
work of setting by fixed bounds the line of separation between two legislative jurisdictions. The
only conflict is among the legal authors who are doing this work. Yet since the expression is
consecrated by good use and is simple we may well make use of it.'" I J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 15 (1935).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
need be a limitation of this approach so as to include only interstate cases in
the United States and to exclude international multistate cases, paradoxically
enough some of the difficulty in the way of acceptance of such an approach is
peculiarly of American manufacture; for that reason, I have devoted some of
this paper to developments in federal common law which have served to
overcome related difficulties in other areas and, if properly understood,
should support my view in the area of choice of law. Further, I believe that
the greater fluidity and resilience of our thinking about choice of law, as well
as the greater pressure toward homogeneity in our substantive law, make the
approach one for which the United States is perhaps more ready than are
other countries. I am not prepared, however, to exclude use of the approach
in international cases.
In our casebook presentation of a large number of cases in diverse areas
in which an apparently concerned jurisdiction applies a rule other than the
rule applicable to wholly domestic cases in that jurisdiction, Professor von
Mehren and I have adopted the term "regulating rule" to refer to the rule so
chosen.' We have suggested that a concerned jurisdiction's "regulating rule"
may be either the rule of some other jurisdiction or a rule specially fashioned
for the multistate situation. To explain why a concerned jurisdiction may
adopt a regulating rule differing from the rule it would apply to a wholly
domestic case continues to be a complicated and perplexing matter.
In the past we described many of such cases as ones in which the
jurisdiction's multistate policies outweigh its domestic-law concerns, multistate
policies being those which reflect the needs of the community of jurisdictions
involved. A more complete statement might be that a concerned jurisdiction
not only weighs its own domestic-law policies against the domestic-law policies
of other concerned jurisdictions, but takes into account, and on occasion makes
decisive, the requirements of the multistate system, 4 a system which may be
thought to exist in fact, or whose existence is posited as an aid in thinking
about proper resolution of the given multistate problem. The rule which
comes to be used may then be described as a reformulated domestic-law rule,
the rule of another jurisdiction (reformulated if necessary), or a specially
fashioned multistate rule. On occasion, a particular case can be, or could have
been, viewed as involving more than one of these possibilities. A good exam-
ple is Bernkrant v. Fowler,5 that celebrated California decision written by Chief
Justice Traynor allowing enforcement, in the face of the California statute of
3. VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 1, at 215.
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(a) recognizes these requirements as a
proper factor for consideration in choice of law.
5. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906 (1961).
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frauds, of a California decedent's oral promise to provide in his will for for-
giveness of the remaining indebtedness of Nevada debtors in connection with
their purchase of his Nevada property. An analysis of California domestic-law
policy might have shown weakness in the evidentiary and cautionary policies
underlying the statute of frauds. That weakness might have been such as to
justify reformulation of the law even for a wholly domestic case presenting
strong countervailing equitable considerations6 or involving extrinsic indica-
tions that the asserted promise had in fact been made.' Even if the court was
not prepared-and it was not-to reformulate the rule for wholly domestic
cases,8 these circumstances would plainly justify moderation in thinking about
the application of domestic-law policy in the multistate case; 9 the court could
then find the policy less compelling, when it is examined in the light of the
concerns of other jurisdictions, of multistate concerns for the transaction that
spills over jurisdictional boundaries and is therefore less clearly subject to any
one jurisdiction's laws, and of domestic-law policies in the forum that are sub-
ordinated in the wholly domestic case but may regain strength upon re-
examination of their relevance in light of the multistate concerns and the
concerns of another jurisdiction. It is more in this spirit, we believe, that Jus-
tice Traynor disposed of the problem in Bernkrant v. Fowler; he pointed to the
contractual policies of Nevada tending toward validating such arrangements,
the difficulties of a California choice-of-law rule for multistate cases that
might hold the question of governing law in abeyance until the promisor's last
domicile was fixed, and the hitherto subordinated California policies-shared
with Nevada-of validating contractual arrangements.
An unsettling difficulty with this solution, which it will be observed pur-
ports to work accommodations out of the various policies held by the two
jurisdictions involved, is the anomalous role of the court in weighing the
strength of policy. Two distinct kinds of policy-weighing occur. The court
assesses the strength of its own jurisdiction's various policies, although pre-
sumably they have been included in the calculus of a legislative determination,
as here with the local Statute of Frauds or Statute of Wills, that usually does
not but may say something about the statute's intended scope. It also assesses
6. See generalv I SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 55.0 (3d ed. 1967).
7. There is some indication that the promise was in fact made. Although Justice Traynor does
not elaborate, he painstakingly recites the facts, among which is the absence, in renegotiation of
the mortgage, of a right which the debtors previously had to subordinate the promisor's mort-
gage to a deed of trust they might execute to secure a construction loan. It might be inferred that
the quid pro quo for relinquishing the right to subordinate was the promise to forgive the re-
maining indebtedness,
8. Cf. A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 1129-31 (2d ed. 1977); VON
MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 1, at 438-39, 469-7 1.
9. Long ago it was pointed out that in the multistate case, an opportunity is presented for a
half-step toward reformulation of the domestic-law rule. See Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the
Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1224-1225 (1946); id. at 1216. Cf. VON MEHREN &
TRAUTMAN, supra note 1, at 600 n.17.
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the weight to be given to the policies of a co-ordinate jurisdiction. No appar-
ent guidelines exist for conducting these two clearly distinct, but equally
nebulous, weighing processes.' 0 This anomaly is identifiable in many other
cases involving the rejection by a concerned jurisdiction of its domestic-law
rule and deference to another jurisdiction's concerns or to its own multistate
concerns that conflict with its domestic-law concerns." Professor Currie's rec-
ognition that a concerned jurisdiction should use moderation and restraint in
applying its domestic-law rules was at best an uneasy departure from his
preference for forum law because of the absence of any firm footing in rec-
ognized institutional sources12 for such a departure and the undoubted open-
ing to untrammeled judicial discretion that it represented.
These obstacles are ones which the courts today nevertheless seem almost
eager to face, in part because they provide relief from the more than occa-
sional irrationality and injustice of simpler approaches. Analysis of the multi-
state policies has been sparse; in our book, we attempt to catalogue what
multistate policies are apparently at work in the cases today.13 In particular
there are policies of the facilitation of multistate activity (which at a minimum
operates to prevent the capricious interference with multistate activity that
might result from the unexpected application of unusual rules having no pol-
icy relevant to the activity' 4 ), of evenhandedness and of administrability of the
law. We have sought to explain that these are policies that might appro-
priately be held by the constituent jurisdictions of a multistate community, in
recognition of the obvious needs of an ad hoc interstate order constructed for
the individual case by the court encountering a multistate problem.
II
At least for communities not bound together by a federal system, it is
understandable and perhaps inevitable that thinking about choice of law
should have begun in terms of the clash of interests of equal independent
sovereigns. It is also understandable in that setting that courts only later
10. Cf. Freund, supra note 9, at 1215.
11. We collect a number of such cases in our casebook, among the most familiar of which are
Bernkrant v. Fowler, supra note 5; Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792
(1937), described in the text at note 54 infra; Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189
(2d Cir. 1955), described in the text at note 55 infra; People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d
595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957) (California statute calling for forfeiture of conditional vendor's interest
in automobile seized for transportation of narcotics if vendor failed to make prescribed character
examination of vendee not applied to Texas vendor who could not be expected to know Califor-
nia law); and Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878) (Massachusetts protective policy for married
woman not applied to Massachusetts wife's guaranty of husband's obligation to Maine merchant).
12. It has been well settled and unquestioned that a court is bound by its own legislature's
directives on choice of law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1). This
paper necessarily questions that position.
13. VON MEHIEN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 1, at 237-327.
14. Cf. People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, supra note 11.
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would come to perceive multistate considerations and ultimately be prepared
to allow such considerations to overcome domestic-law interests. Perhaps
within the United States the early thinking about choice of law was so depen-
dent on notions of territorial sovereignty, possibly influenced by Huber, that
our thinking too tended to stress the clash and to ignore the interdependence
of the constituent states. Story certainly drew heavily on territorial theories,' 5
although it is most unlikely that he himself, especially in light of his opinion
for the Court in Swift v. Tyson, 6 could be charged with denigration of what
we today think of as the multistate, or more general, interests of the con-
stituent states.
However the history may cut, the modern position is anomalous. A look at
the decisions of American courts suggests the curious conclusion that we see
the needs of a multistate order more clearly in the international arena than in
the interstate arena. Quite recently, the Supreme Court itself has shown so-
licitous appreciation of the special demands of international order. In The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company,'1 7 the Court rejected the lower court's as-
sumption of jurisdiction-which it thought was compelled by earlier Supreme
Court decisions-in a case in which the parties to an international contract of
towage had stipulated for litigation in London. Much could have been said
for the assumption of jurisdiction in favor of the American plaintiff in the
particular case, but the Court seemed to regard as decisive the demands of
the international business setting in which the controversy arose:"8
For at least two decades we have witnessed an expansion of overseas commer-
cial activities by business enterprises based in the United States. The barrier
of distance that once tended to confine a business concern to a modest terri-
tory no longer does so. Here we see an American company with special ex-
pertise contracting with a foreign company to tow a complex machine
thousands of miles across seas and oceans. The expansion of American busi-
ness and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn con-
tracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved
under our laws and in our courts.
Similar regard for the special demands of international order was shown in a
case involving a stipulation for arbitration in an international transaction, and
15. For evaluations of Story, see Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws--One
Hundred Years After, 48 HARV. L. REV. 15 (1934); Nadelmann, Some Historical Notes on the Doctrinal
Sources of American Conflicts Law, in Ius ET LEX: FESTGABE ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG VON MAx GUTZ-
WILLER 263, 272-276 (1959); Nadelmann,Joseph Story's Contribution to American Conflicts Law: A Com-
ment, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 230 (1961).
16. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) ("... the true interpretation and effect [of contracts and other
instruments of a commercial nature] are to be sought, not in the decision of local tribunals, but
in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence .... The law respecting ne-
gotiable instruments may be truly declared in the language of Cicero ... to be in a great measure,
not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world.").
17. 407 U.S. 1 (1972); see, e.g., Nadelmann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United States: The Road
to Zapata, 21 AM.J. CoMP. L. 124 (1973).
18. 407 U.S. at 8-9.
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again multistate considerations overcame strong claims for American judicial
jurisdiction designed to vindicate federal-securities-law policies of protecting
investors.19
The familiar American cases involving international conflict of laws also
represent less a conflict between jurisdictions than a serious striving for rules
that meet the demands of the international order. A list of those cases,'20 pro-
ceeding roughly chronologically, would include Cammell v. Sewell," Hope v.
Brewer,"2 Hutchison v. Ross," Lauritzen v. Larsen, 4 and Siegelman v. Cunard
White Star Ltd. 2 5 Apart from Hutchison v. Ross (which should have been de-
cided the other way and would be today on proper analysis of the other
jurisdiction's concerns26 ), the reason for the decisions seems related less to
shared concerns or multistate concerns of the particular concerned jurisdic-
tions than to an appreciation of the general needs of order, system and justice
in international transactions, without regard to any particular idiosyncracies of
the two jurisdictions involved. A Justice Traynor dealing with any of these
cases need not have strained to find multistate policies of the forum in order
to justify rejection of the forum's domestic law. One dares to suppose that he
would simply have consulted all of the experience to be found in judicial or
other materials, of any or all states, and proceeded with caution and intelli-
gence to a reasoned solution of the novel multistate problem presented. Sure-
ly all of these cases are better described that way than as examples of a com-
plex accommodation of the special policies, albeit including their multistate
policies, of the concerned jurisdictions. I cannot believe that Cammell v. Sewell
19. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); see Note, International Arbitration-
Extraterritorial Application of United States Securities Laws Denied; Arbitration Clause in Investment
Contract Enforced, 16 HARV. INT. L.J. 705 (1975).
20. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963), is of course also an interna-
tional case, but it does not involve subordination by a concerned jurisdiction of its own rule.
21. 5 Hurl. & N. 728 (Exch. Ch. 1860) (sale, under Norwegian law, of timber on board ship
that foundered in Norway upheld when timber brought to England, although the consignees of
the timber and the purchaser in Norway were English). Although this is an English case, it has
become so much a part of American conflicts teaching and thinking that I have no hesitation in
asserting that the case has been adopted here and is properly included in a list of "American"
cases. It provides the basis for RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146, ill. 1; cf. id.
§§ 245, 247, ill. 2.
22. 136 N.Y. 126, 32 N.E. 558 (1892) (New York testator's gift to establish charitable trust in
Scotland upheld, although establishment of such a trust in New York would have been invalid for
indefiniteness of beneficiaries and violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities); see VON MEHREN &
TRAUTMAN, supra note 1, at 309 q.3.
23. 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933) (Quebec domiciliary's revocation of New York inter
vivos trust, in violation of Quebec rule against alteration of antenuptial agreement, upheld under
New York law).
24. 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (Jones Act inapplicable to Danish seaman on board Danish ship
under Danish articles who had signed on in New York).
25. 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955). See text at note 55, infra.
26. But ci. Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637 (1965). See generaly R. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 342-45 (1971).
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or Siegelman or Lauritzen purports to proceed from, or be confined by, the
policies respectively of England and Norway, England and New York, or the
United States and Denmark. The approach undertaken, and the rules an-
nounced, are appropriate to and proceed from an understanding of the
needs of an international order and reflect an effort, unilaterally as it were by
the national forums involved, to contribute to an international body of law
applicable to all international cases, although-as is explicit in each case-the
law would yield in the face of a strong policy in a concerned jurisdiction. 27
It seems clear, however, that even if such a body of private international
law is developing internationally, there would be substantial apprehension
about transposing any such developments to the interstate arena, to the extent
that it was seen as being independent of the various concerns of the particular
states involved. In interstate conflict of laws, we have become accustomed to
pronouncements by the Supreme Court that, subject to constitutional re-
straints, conflict of laws is a matter left to the states. Most current writing, and
the opinion of eminent scholars who have recently addressed the problem, in
particular Professors B. Currie and D. Cavers, 28 con'cur. At bottom is an as-
sumption that the appropriate allocation of law-making competence in our
federal system, finally secured after interminable confusion by Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, requires that we restrict our solutions of choice-of-law problems
within the United States to the materials found in state law, unless the indi-
cated solution is so capricious or irrational that Constitutional sanctions are
appropriate.
I disagree, but in doing so I think it is important first to trace the de-
velopments since Erie of the federal common law and to insist on a particular
attitude about those developments which I think is indispensable before this
experience can be argued to be appropriate and helpful for the general prob-
lem of choice of law.
III
I start with the view that a good deal of the surprise and associated alarm
at repeated, and apparently unpredictable, identification by the Supreme
Court of new areas for the development of federal common law have been, or
ought at least to have been, put to rest by Judge Friendly. His acute percep-
tion is that a Hegelian process of synthesis is involved, with Swift v. Tyson the
27. See, e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., supra note 25 ("... we express no opinion
on what result would follow if we had stronger policies at stake"). Comparable indications are to
be found in Cammell v. Sewell, supra note 21, and Lauritzen v. Larson, supra note 24.
28. E.g., D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-oF-LAw PROCESS 216-224 (1965), although federal law bind-
ing on state courts is not here directly addressed. But see Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal
System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963); Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1191 (1967).
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thesis, Erie the antithesis, and the new federal common law the synthesis. 29 A
proper understanding of this wisdom, I believe, could put some of the less
cautious statements of the Supreme Court in perspective.
30
Federal common law, like all federal law, should be seen as building on
and supplementing the primary law in our system generated by the states;
federal common law differing from state law needs to be justified by specific
federal requirements left unsatisfied by state law and ought to depart from
state law only to the extent of these specifically identified requirements. To
suggest a clear example, the seminal decision in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States3t seems correct in releasing the courts from an obligation flowing from
Erie to follow state law willy-nilly to decide "the rights and duties of the
United States on commercial paper which it issues." The decision seems
clearly wrong, however, in proceeding to formulate a substantive rule of fed-
eral law differing from what was doubtless the law of almost all states, without
a showing that the rule responded to particular federal needs left unsatisfied
by state law or not taken into account in the balance of policy struck by the
state rules. To substitute a different judgment on a question of law continu-
ously faced in state law32 without demonstrating that the national setting of
the question introduced new considerations not relevant in the state context is
unwarranted and antithetical, I believe, to a proper formulation of federal
law. In the particular case, given the broad uniformity of state law and the
urgency of ready acceptance by existing commercial channels of federal funds
designed to revive the economy, the creation of a different rule for federal
checks that would seem to require separate handling of such checks appears
capricious and inconsistent with the specific purpose of the federal program
involved and with more general federal interests to work with state law and to
leave it undisturbed particularly when such a broad measure of uniformity
existed among the states.
What might be described as an antithesis to the Clearfield thesis, the deci-
sion in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn. v. Parnell,33 is subject to
comparable analysis. There the Court, in dealing with a question of the bur-
den of proof of good faith as between the holder and transferee of govern-
ment bonds, asked, it seems properly, whether the floating of such bonds
29. Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 421
(1964).
30. Indeed, as is elaborated in the text that follows, the broadness of some of the early "fed-
eral common law" decisions such as Clearfield (described in text at note 31 infra) and Parnell
(described in text at note 33 infra) might themselves be seen in Hegelian terms, with synthesis
now beginning to emerge.
31. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
32. The Court appears to ground the federal rule on its view of a proper balance of the
position of the drawee and the acceptor of a forged instrument: ". . . [Wje do not think that he
who accepts a forged signature of a payee deserves that preferred treatment." Id. at 370.
33. 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
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"might somehow or other be adversely affected by the local rule of a particu-
lar State regarding the liability of a converter .... ." It concluded that any
such federal impact was "far too speculative, far too remote to justify the
application of federal law to transactions essentially of local concern." Given
again the broad uniformity of state law on the issue and the fact that the issue
is one of balancing considerations of fairness as between two innocent parties,
an issue continuously faced in a variety of state-law contexts, the result in
using state law seems unexceptionable, so long as no federal need to depart
from that rule appeared. The language of the Court, however, can be read as
suggesting some impropriety in subjecting these "transactions essentially of
local concern" to federal law. This observation seems to me an implicit bow to
Erie that is unfortunate; if a federal need to depart from state law could be
shown, the formulation of a federal rule would be not only proper but desir-
able. One might argue, for example, that a federal rule putting the burden
on the holder of the paper might be justified if these bonds had been de-
signed to serve as a substitute for currency, so that freer transferability of the
bonds would be promoted. If that were the view, there would still be a ques-
tion whether federal law ought to be constructed that involved departure
from a well-settled rule of state law and whether separate treatment of these
bonds would disrupt other transactions in the particular banking channels
involved-which appears at least less likely than requiring the separate treat-
ment of government checks, as in Clearfield. If, on the other hand, the bonds
were designed to encourage investment, a rule protecting the holder and put-
ting a greater burden on the transferee would plainly be justified, so that the
specific federal purpose would clearly indicate use of the state rule and leave
no further issues to be faced.
That the Supreme Court may today be more ready to steer a middle
course, perhaps synthesizing Clearfield and Parnell, is suggested by a pair of
cases involving federal savings bonds purchased with community funds. In
Free v. Bland,3 4 a federal interest in successful sale of these bonds as an aspect
of management of the national debt was found sufficient to override state
requirements that the form required to pass community property to the sur-
viving spouse was a testament complying with usual requirements of the Stat-
ute of Wills. There was, it might be observed, a satisfactory surrogate for a
will in the formalities and evidence entailed in the purchase of the bonds. On
the other hand, that same federal interest was insufficient, in Yiatchos v.
Yiatchos3" to override the property interests that would be assured to the sur-
viving spouse under state community property law. These cases might well be
seen as ones in which significant local concerns were respected where they
existed, but where none existed, or the concerns could be regarded as having
34. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
35. 376 U.S. 306 (1964). But cf. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
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been met but in a way more consistent with federal needs, federal law pre-
vailed.
IV
If, then, federal common law becomes a modest way of releasing courts
from an obligation to follow state law in order to vindicate identifiable federal
concerns which cannot be accommodated satisfactorily within the body of
relevant state law, it would be a useful vehicle for further development of
choice of law within the United States. Much of what Professor von Mehren
and I have sought to explain as a concerned jurisdiction's subordination of
domestic policy to its own multistate concerns-and often the explanation
seems adequate enough for the case-could then be seen as being grounded
ultimately in a body of general law common to all states which, if it is neces-
sary to find a source of that law to satisfy Holmes' Austinian rejection of the
brooding omnipresence in the sky, is federal common law.
I shall not here dwell on the constitutionality of such a conception; should
it be decided that such a development is desirable, it would not be overly
difficult to find constitutional sanction for it, whether one sought specific
text,3 6 or, as has often been sufficient and eminently sound, implication from
the federal scheme.3 1 In light of the authorities, it must be concluded cate-
gorically-although for many it is hardly an obvious proposition-that federal
common law can be created by judges when analytically a federal concern
exists; the Constitution not only does not stand in the way but in spirit and
36. Both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the fourteenth amendment are available; see
Baxter, supra note 28. Each explicitly authorizes legislation. Of the two, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause is perhaps more appropriate, in light of its place in the Constitutional scheme. See W.
COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 90-107 (1949); cf. Jackson, Full
Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945).
37. Adjustment of the competing interests of two states or of their citizens engaged in multi-
state transactions is as "intrinsically" a federal problem as the resolution of interstate water dis-
putes, see Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) ("whether
the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of
'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be
conclusive," per Brandeis, J., on the same day as his opinion for the Court in Erie), disputes
involving international affairs, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)
("The problems surrounding the act of state doctrine are, albeit for different reasons, as intrinsi-
cally federal as are those involved in water apportionment or boundary disputes."), or those
involving maritime questions touching navigable waters that have not been brought within the
reach of the commerce clause, see Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty
Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (1954); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972) ("When we deal with air or water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a
federal common law .... ") In these instances federal common law has developed without Con-
gressional action and for the most part in the absence of specific article I delegation of power to
Congress. Although Full Faith and Credit should be enough, see note 36 supra, federal common
law may be a more comfortable vehicle until we better understand the line-or that there is no
line-between federal common law and constitutional law. Cf. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
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intendment has been found to inspire rather than to inhibit the growth of
federal common law.
3 8
It seems to me that the development of a conception that a judge, whether
in a state or in a federal court, was free to consult, and to find authority in, a
body of law distinct from the law of the particular states involved in a con-
flicts dispute would go far toward removing some of the most troublesome
aspects of functional analysis as it is now practiced and promote an atmos-
phere conducive to a sounder development of the field. To revert to
Bernkrant, Justice Traynor would not need to be confined to the multi-
jurisdictional policies of California, nor to "shared" policies of California and
Nevada, to explain how the California court can restrict the scope of Califor-
nia domestic law. He would instead be speaking as a state judge exercising
national authority, which more easily explains why it is relevant to consider
the shared policies of California and Nevada-even if the California legisla-
ture had sought to make that approach irrelevant-and why he is not only
free to weigh the strength of the California and Nevada concerns but indeed
is under a duty to do so and to reach a solution which accommodates those
concerns with the needs of the multistate order.
This understanding that the state court ultimately exercises federal author-
ity in conflicts cases would also far more easily explain why some of us dis-
agree with the most recent guest-statute decision of the New York Court of
Appeals. In the Neumeier case,3 9 New York refused to impose liability in an
action involving a New York driver, an Ontario guest passenger, and an acci-
dent in Ontario. Had the guest passenger come from New York, the New
York driver would have been held responsible whether the accident occurred
in New York or in Ontario.4 ° On a view of the problem as one involving only
the concerns of New York or Ontario, it is understandable that the New York
judge might believe he is being asked to extend the benevolence of New York
law, at the expense of New York drivers, to the whole world. 41 Viewed in the
context of a multistate order, however, in which guest statutes are increasingly
the exception rather than the rule and on analysis embody obsolescent pol-
icies-which at the height of their power undoubtedly were to protect On-
tario drivers and their insurers and quite certainly not particularly to deny
recovery to Ontario plaintiffs negligently injured even if by an Ontario
driver-the picture is vastly different. In this setting, the obvious differ-
38. See note 37 supra.
39. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972); see
Trautman, Rule or Reason in Choice of Law: A Comment on Neumeier, 1 VT. L. REv. 1 (1976).
40. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
41. See Reese, Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 548, 563 (1971) ("Was tile New York rule
really intended to be manna for the entire world?"), quoted with approval by Chief Judge Fuld in
his opinion for the court in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 130, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 71, 286
N.E.2d 454, 458-59 (1972).
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entiation between Ontario and New York plaintiffs is also a consideration;
to avoid the appearance of invidious discrimination, 42 it should require a
strong relevant Ontario policy to warrant departure from the multistate
norm-and indeed the norm of Ontario for cases not within the driver-
protecting policies of its guest statute-of recovery for negligently caused
injury.43 In short, New York should not regard itself as being asked to "ex-
tend" the advantages of New York law to the resident of a jurisdiction which
affords less protection to the victim of an automobile accident. It should not
be guided by questions of whether it was "advancing" the interests of New
York or of New Yorkers, an approach that tends to become parochial and
demeaning in this context. If it saw itself as exercising national authority, it
would consider the demands of the multistate order, 44 the extent to which
departures from the normal expectations in a multistate case are justified by
strong and legitimate local policy, and the basic policies required for a proper
functioning of a multistate order. Those policies would at least include
policies to shield multistate transactions from capricious interference by rules
lacking significant policy bases and to foster rules that treat like cases alike,
distinguishing parties and cases from each other only on the basis of signifi-
cant local policy that is relevant to the distinctions made between cases.
Indeed, if one looks at many of the approaches to solution of cases of true
conflict that have been urged recently, it may be more clear why it might be
quite salutary to conceive of these approaches as having their footings se-
curely in a federal common law of choice of law. Professor Baxter's article, 45
which discusses the need for recognition that choice of law is federal together
with his "comparative-impairment" approach, effectively demonstrates the
strength of this observation. I agree with him, although not entirely with his
particular approach, and seek to renew the argument that all such approaches
42. See Bergan, J., dissenting in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d at 132, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 73,
286 N.E.2d at 460.
43. See Trautman, supra note 39.
44. I must concede that the multistate order involved in Neumeier is not interstate but interna-
tional. To the extent, then, that I am pressing for a federal-common-law footing for choice of law
in Neumeier, I need to acknowledge that the international context may differ from the interstate
context. To an undefined extent, cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Wilburn Boat Co. v.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 348 U.S. 310, 321, 323 (1954) ("Is it to be assumed that were the
Queen Maty, on a world pleasure cruise, to touch at New York City, New Orleans and Galveston,
a Lloyd's policy covering the voyage would be subjected to the varying insurance laws of New
York, Louisiana and Texas?"), a federal-common-law basis for horizontal choice of law is more
justified in the international context. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964). The proper content of a federal-common-law rule of horizontal choice of law is more
readily formulated, on the other hand, when the substantive-law premises of the various con-
cerned jurisdictions are similar; that is likely to occur more frequently in interstate than interna-
tional cases, although I believe the Canadian experience with guest statutes so closely parallels
our own that it is excusable if we deal with Neumeier as an interstate case, just as we have tended
to do with Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 20.
45. Baxter, supra note 28.
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will be nurtured by growth in federal soil. For example, although Professor
Cavers professes a desire to have his principles of preference subject to the
restraints of the forum's legislature, 46 it is not clear why they would not be
given added strength by such a conception. That seems so particularly to the
extent that those principles would guide a concerned jurisdiction facing a true
conflict toward favoring a higher standard of conduct or financial protection
over its own lower standard4 7 or a lower standard when its standard is
higher. 48 The considerations of fairness, of fulfilling expectations, and of
avoidance of capricious results, all of which support such guidance, would it
seems be far more comfortably found in a general attitude, derived by com-
parative study of the law of many jurisdictions about the proper attitude to-
ward those considerations, than in the forum's policy alone. Presumably much
the same could be said, but even more tellingly, of Professor von Mehren's
and my suggestion that emerging law can be favored and regressing law dis-
favored, 49 of Professor Leflar's "better-law" approach, 50 and indeed of all ap-
proaches seeking to weigh or assess competing policies, including all ap-
proaches favoring validation 5 whether as a result of alternative reference or
of party autonomy or more generally. All of these reflect efforts of concerned
jurisdictions, by subordinating local views of substantive policy, to accommo-
date their law to, and mesh it more satisfactorily with, the needs and policies
of other jurisdictions, which in turn are also concerned with multistate trans-
actions and prepared to yield to a multistate order. If that is so, the contours
and content of the multistate law that emerges can, I believe, be better de-
fined by considerations drawn from the overarching multistate order than
ones drawn from but confined by the particular views of the jurisdictions
concerned in a given multistate situation.
V
This suggestion of a multistate law as a possible source of rules for
choice-of-law problems is perhaps simply another way of expressing an earlier
suggestion of multijurisdictional rules specially fashioned to the occasion.
Once, however, the source of such multijurisdictional rules is seen as the
overarching multistate order of the federal system, so that the rules are not
46. See D. CAVERS, supra note 28, at 218.
47. As seems possible with Principle I (id. at 139) (as his first illustration would suggest when
Arizona is the forum, id. at 1410-142); Principle Ill (id. at 159); and Principle IV (id. at 166).
48. E.g., Principles II (id. at 146) and V (id. at 177).
49. See especiallv VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 1, at 377.
50. See, e.g., R. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1584 (1966).
51. Even RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS cannot avoid this process of compara-
tive assessment of policy, although it surfaces primarily in areas in which it is so well established
that its existence cannot be denied. See, e.g., id. §§ 187, 203, 270, as well as § 6(2)(a), (d), (e), and
(f) and accompanying comment.
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confined by being strictly tied to the law and policy of the jurisdictions con-
cerned, it is perhaps possible to envisage a different mechanism entirely for
the multistate problem. We have become so accustomed by tradition and
theory to ideas of conflict, choice and selection that other possible mech-
anisms have not commended themselves. The substance today, however, of
much of "choice of law," or, more felicitously, "multistate law," does seem
better understood in terms of a mechanism other than one of selection or
choice. The process seems rather to be one of the use of what, for lack of a
better introductory term, I shall for the moment call a normal rule, to be
overridden, however, when a concerned jurisdiction has a strong relevant pol-
icy in conflict with the "normal" rule. Most "conflicts" rules in the areas in
which the normal policies of the law tend toward validating or facilitating
private ordering-in marriage, contract, property and trust, for example
-could better be expressed in terms of validation of the arrangement pri-
vately undertaken except when some jurisdiction with a strong policy, typi-
cally one of protection of one of the parties to the transaction but sometimes
of protection of other interests, would strike down the arrangement. Exam-
ples of this attitude are clear in most formulations of rules with respect to the
validity of a marriage, and the cases clearly uphold marriages except when
strong relevant policies-usually of the domicile of the parties-stand in the
way. 52 The same phenomenon occurs in contracts and trusts. In Bernkrant v.
Fowler, the decedent's promise to make a will is upheld because the local pro-
tective policy is not strong enough to interfere; 53 in Shannon v. Irving Trust
Co. ,5 the settlor's stipulation for his domicile's law, which would validate his
trust, is upheld because there is no policy basis for invoking the invalidating
New York Rule Against Perpetuities; in Siegelinan v. Cunard S.S. Co., 5 the
parties' stipulation for English law is upheld, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit making it plain, however, that the result might be different if
stronger policies were at stake.
Of course the holdings of these cases can be expressed in terms of selec-
tion between the "laws" of two concerned jurisdictions. They can be expressed
in those terms even more agreeably if those "laws" include the multijurisdic-
tional policies of those jurisdictions. But it is also possible, and for some situa-
52. One need go no further than RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (Valid-
ity of Marriage) and especially id. Comments b, i, although the cases in the area have always been
unruly precisely because of an attitude, sometimes explicit, that a "normal" attitude of validation
ought to prevail unless the domicile had a strong policy on which it was prepared to insist. See,
especially, Fisher v. Fisher, 250 N.Y. 313, 165 N.E. 460 (1929), and In re May's Estate, 305 N.Y.
486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953).
53. See text following note 5 supra.
54. See note 11 supra.
55. See note 25 supra. A general statement suggesting the offset of protective policies against
policies favoring the integrity of transactions was made by Professor Cavers in Cavers, A Critique
of the Choice-of-Law Process [sic]: Addendum 1972, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 652 (1976).
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tions it may be more helpful, to express these holdings in terms of normal
rules of "multistate law" which operate except when strong policies are at
stake.
Whether this conception is applicable beyond the realm of planned trans-
actions may be more problematical, but that is a question worth exploring for
a moment. If, as I have suggested elsewhere, 56 it is helpful to ask in guest
statute cases whether shared views favoring deterrence and compensation
ought to apply or, in the particular circumstances, ought not to because a
strong policy exists justifying departure from those shared policies, perhaps a
different content for what is the "normal" rule has been supplied but, with
that variation, the same process can be said to be at work.
VI
If this conception of multistate law came to be accepted, it would provide
a way of seeing interrelationships between choice of law in general (horizontal
choice of law) and the balance between state and federal law in our federal
system (vertical choice of law) that have at best been only dimly perceived as
yet. It might in addition give support to a more balanced view, suggested
earlier, of the way in which federal common law ought to develop.
In vertical choice of law, as has been intimated and will be explained more
fully below, it is often more responsive to the demands of the federal system,
as that system has come to be understood, to conceive of federal law operat-
ing only as a limit or boundary, a floor or a ceiling, on state law. That seems
inevitably so with a federal law that functions interstitially and, as has been
suggested, in principle should be created only in response to, and to the ex-
tent of, federal requirements not taken into account in the formulation of the
state law rules. It is for comparable and perhaps more obvious reasons that
federal constitutional law often takes the form of limits or boundaries on state
law; this phenomenon has recently been highlighted in the series of cases
defining the First Amendment's effect on state laws of defamation: federal
law provides a limiting framework beyond which state law may not go but
within which state law is free to provide as it will. 5I To the extent that federal
common law can also be understood as operating, or as being more rational if
it did so operate, as a boundary on state law, we would have a phenomenon
parallel to that suggested for horizontal choice of law. Thus federal common
law would grow out of but at times enlarge upon or exclude the normally
applicable state law in the same way as it has been suggested that a concerned
56. E.g., Trautman, supra note 39, at 21.
57. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For a thoughtful treatment of
the potential of federal common law as a boundary on state law, see M. Broad, "Incorporating
State Law into the Federal Structure: Floors and Ceilings in State-Federal Accommodations" (un-
published manuscript in Harvard Law School Library), on which the following discussion draws
heavily.
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jurisdiction's law might diverge from and in instances of legitimate and strong
policy exclude the normally applicable multistate law, law which itself is for-
mulated from the norms found in state law. 58
In the discussion that follows, a brief attempt will be made to view the
interrelation of horizontal and vertical choice of law from this perspective. At
the outset, however, it may help to draw further illustration from vertical
choice of law, focusing on its potential development as a law primarily pro-
viding boundaries-floors or ceilings--on state law.
It has already been suggested that the Clearfield case,59 in carving out an
area for the possible development of federal law independently of a perceived
need to depart from state law, misconceived the proper operation of federal
common law. In its preoccupation with the problem of explaining why Erie
did not control, the Court failed to take the necessary further step of asking
in what ways, if any, state law, which should be seen as the foundation upon
which federal law builds and to which federal law forms an exception, needed
revision or rejection in order to serve the federal purposes. Such an approach
would have been particularly commendable in the context of Clearfield. The
Government was using established commercial channels and arrangements for
the purpose of carrying out its fiscal functions, and there was a particular
need to see to it that the private channels availed of were not unduly dis-
rupted by the injection of federal transactions. Hence, it should have been
58. In a sense, a more strict parallel would exist if one supposed that, as a practical matter,
federal-common-law rules and the proposed multistate rule operated only as occasional limits on
state law. Such a view would follow from the fact that in the case of federal common law and the
vertical choice it often is sufficient-and for that reason customary-to think in terms of a choice
between a federal-common-law rule and the rule of a particular state. This analysis does not hold,
however, if there is more than one concerned state; it is, therefore, sufficient only if there is no
horizontal choice-of-law problem.
If a horizontal choice-of-law problem exists, it should be treated on the basis suggested in the
text: should the normal or usual rule in the legal universe of the various jurisdictions concerned
be departed from because of a strongly-held divergent view in a jurisdiction with a relevant
concern? Where the answer is yes, a basis for possible departure from multistate law is provided.
Thus, one limit or boundary to the operation of multistate law occurs when the problem is of
local concern and the primarily concerned state legitimately holds a strong policy which it desires
to assert. Another limit or boundary to multistate law occurs when the problem is of national
concern and there are special federal requirements not satisfied by multistate law or if the par-
ticular state primarily concerned has deviant or parochial views.
This suggestion may pose a threat to the underpinnings of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), directing federal diversity courts to follow the choice-of-law rules "pre-
vailing in the states in which they sit." Id. at 494. The basic command of Erie, however, was that
federal law should not be created, in the interest-I believe-of reducing uncertainty about the
rules that apply to primary conduct. Klaxon reintroduced some of that uncertainty by making the
federal court "touch base" with the law of the state in which it sat, regardless of whether that
place, chosen on the basis of jurisdictional and venue rules that do not address the choice-of-law
problem, was the appropriate place to start. If the "state law" to be applied under Erie were seen
as the multistate law proposed in the text, to be subordinated to a particular state's law only on
the basis I have suggested, Erie's purpose would come far closer to being realized than under
Klaxon.
59. See text following note 31 supra.
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inevitable to think in terms of altering the state-law arrangements and under-
standings as little as possible and to fashion different federal rules only when
necessary to effectuate the federal purpose. Instead, as noted above,80 the
Court blandly substituted its own view on a question that seems to be pecul-
iarly fit for state law: the relative equities as between the drawer bank and the
acceptor of a forged indorsement.
In Clearfield then, although federal power may well be said to exist, that
abstract proposition ought not to have allowed the Court to proceed to its
own view on a question settled in state law and not disruptive of-indeed in
context quite consistent with-the federal purpose to pump money into the
economy. This is the proper view of the federal law to be fashioned under
Clearfield, I think; under this model, state law would be taken, whatever its
content, except when the federal purpose requires a limit on what state law
provides. In another context, which I think is susceptible of the same analysis,
the Court did just that, saying that "the congressional purpose can best be
accomplished by application of settled state rules . . .so long as it is plain, as it
is here, that the state rules do not effect a discrimination against the Govern-
ment, or patently run counter to the terms of the Act."6' And in describing
Congressional adoption of state law to determine the liability of the Govern-
ment under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Court observed: 62
... It is evident that the Act was not patterned to operate with complete
independence from the principles of law developed in the common law and
refined by statute and judicial decision in the various States. Rather, it was
60. See note 32 supra.
61. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court in Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver
County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946). Compare the language of Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the
Court in DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956), adopting "the ready-made body of state
law to define the word 'children' " in the Copyright Act; a State could not "use the word 'chil-
dren' in a way entirely strange to those familiar with its ordinary usage, but at least to the extent
that there are permissible variations in the ordinary concept of 'children' we deem state law
controlling."
62. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1962). That the Court, after lengthy yawing.
may now be on course is a view one could take of its recent opinion in Miree v. DeKalb County,
Ga., 97 S. Ct. 2490 (1977), infra note 75. Compare, generally, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 470-471 (2d ed., P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechs-
ler 1973).
To the extent, however, that federal common law serves only to modify state law when federal
interests demand, a significant problem of federal jurisdiction may be created. Such an approach
might make it unwieldy to attempt distinctions between claims grounded in federal law and those
grounded in state law. If such distinctions are significant, the conception of a case "arising under
... the Laws of the United States," U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (now held to comprehend all federal
common law cases, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), with the pos-
sible exception (the City of Milwaukee case is arguably in admiralty) of judge-made law in admiralty,
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959)) might require re-thinking
if such a limited role for federal common law were to be accepted. I think the Constitution is up
to the task. Compare Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, dissenting in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353
U.S. 448, 460 (1957).
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designed to build upon the legal relationships formulated and characterized
by the States, and, to that extent, the statutory scheme is exemplary of the
generally interstitial character of federal law. If Congress had meant to alter
or supplant the legal relationships developed by the States, it could specifically
have done so to further the limited objectives of the Tort Claims Act. That is,
notwithstanding the generally interstitial character of the law, Congress, in
waiving the immunity of the Government for tortious conduct of its em-
ployees, could have imposed restrictions and conditions on the extent and
substance of its liability.
A clear, although rather esoteric, example of an appropriate occasion for
the functioning of federal common law as a boundary on otherwise applicable
state law is seen in admiralty.6 3 For over half a century, while state law was in
the process of abandoning the common law rule under which no action lay
for wrongful death (and Congress echoed that process by providing actions
for the wrongful death of seamen and of anyone meeting death on the high
seas), no federal wrongful death action was available for use in connection
with maritime torts to longshoremen within state territorial waters. Admiralty
courts, however, responded by "borrowing" the appropriate state wrongful
death actions in such situations. This was a "jerry-built" remedy which could
not survive as federal maritime tort law grew to be far more generous than
the developing state law. By 1959, it was clear that some maritime duties,
notably that to provide a seaworthy ship, had surpassed much of state law and
that the expedient of borrowing a state wrongful death remedy would not be
sufficient if the remedy had to be taken with all its state-law impedimenta
---especially the state definitions of duty, contributory negligence, time limita-
tions and the beneficiaries entitled to participate in wrongful death action
proceeds. But the Supreme Court stubbornly espoused an idea not unrelated
to the "vested rights" theory of horizontal conflicts, which had not yet been
completely laid to rest, and held, in The Tungu5 v. Skovgaard,64 that when
admiralty adopted state law, it took it bag and baggage. Precisely at issue was
the question whether the federal duty of seaworthiness was available in an
action "borrowed" from the New Jersey wrongful death act. The Court held
that it was, but only because, as the Court of Appeals had found, New Jersey
would include within the "wrongful act, neglect or default" that was prere-
quisite to recovery under the New Jersey Act the federal rule of unseawor-
thiness. New Jersey law was applicable, but it encompassed, through incorpo-
ration by reference, the federal duty. Justice Brennan, in a notable
concurrence," insisted that it should not be said that state law incorporated a
federal standard but that the state remedy was taken up to complete the re-
63. There has been more experience with federal common law in admiralty than elsewhere,
and it is not surprising that rich illustration of methodological possibilities is found there.
64. 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
65. Id. at 597. His opinion, a concurrence on this point, dissented as to reference to state law
for determination of possible defenses.
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medy for violation of a federal duty: "It is the federal maritime law that looks
to the state law of remedies here, not the state law that incorporates a federal
standard of care." But that more manageable notion failed to carry the Court.
The next case found the Court asked to approve the borrowing of state law
that was more generous than federal law to the longshoreman (and by the
same token more burdensome to the shipowner.) State law again prevailed
but by a coalition of Justices not unlike some strange Congressional alliance:
Justice Stewart, who had written for the Court in The Tungus and was joined
there by Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan and Whittaker, was joined this
time only by Justice Clark, in holding that state law was applicable with all its
incidents. They were, however, also joined by Justice Brennan and the other
three who had agreed with him in The Tungus, by compulsion of The Tungus.
The other three Justices dissented; Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Frankfur-
ter and, at least on this point, by Justice Whittaker, wrote-in a fine
opinion-that state law could not impose a greater duty than that permitted
by federal law. Much of Justice Harlan's opinion can be read as saying that
federal law provides a boundary-here a ceiling-on the state law, which
is otherwise free to operate. Although it may well be that this methodology
is not the correct choice for this area of the law, 66 the technique in the con-
text of what the Court had previously decided seems quite sound and worthy
of note.
A regime of federal common law under which the courts-federal or
state-draw as heavily as possible upon state law and depart occasionally by
limiting that law so as not to exceed certain boundaries, strikes me as being
not only congenial to the best traditions of federal law and judicial law-
making but the most attractive way of realizing the potential of our compli-
66. Perhaps federal law should operate without regard to state law as to the duty involved in
these cases, since federal law does so when the injury does not result in death. However, the
Court in later reaching that position by deciding, in Moragne v. States Marines Lines, 398 U.S.
375 (1970), that a judicially-created federal wrongful death action does exist, also seemed to
suggest, erroneously it seems, that federal law would then also decide other issues including the
beneficiaries of the wrongful death action. That issue, as Justice Brennan had-it seems
rightly-said in The Tungus, should be governed by state law. That it was Justice Harlan who
wrote for the Court in Moragne seems surprising and lamentable, to the extent that all issues now
may be governed by federal law, and it is at least as anomalous that Justice Brennan joined the
Court in Moragne and thus failed to preserve the very important point about beneficiaries that he
had insisted on in The Tungus. David Currie's characterization of some of the earlier part of this
story, and other related stories, continues unabated as the apt one. See D. Currie, Federalism and
the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess", 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 158.
I do not mean to suggest that an approach to federal common law on an issue-by-issue basis
will always prove appropriate. It may well be, although I am in no position to assert it, that a
"wholesale" approach to federal common law is needed in areas such as the one identified in
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Even there,
however, the more mundane issues might find solace if not solution in state law. See, e.g., Local
174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696
(1966). Nor do I minimize the conceptual difficulties of such a view in dealing with the "federal-
question" jurisdiction. See note 62 supra; note 79 infra.
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cated hierarchies, federal and state, of judicial law-making authority. And the
same can be said of a multistate law to deal with horizontal choice-of-law
problems, if that law is seen as functioning unless a strong state law policy
forbids. It was, I believe, in this spirit that Mr. Justice Jackson wrote his
profound concurring opinion in the D'Oench, Duhme case 67 shortly after the
decision in Erie. In D'Oench, Duhme, involving confusion in the lower courts on
the question of which of two states' law was applicable, in an action by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., to the liability of an accommodation maker
of a note used by a bank to conceal the true state of its assets, Justice Jackson
was moved to write a classic essay on federal law-making. The Court, in a
regrettably facile opinion by Justice Douglas, had found a federal rule of lia-
bility implicit in Congressional establishment of the insurance corporation and
"a general policy to protect the institution of banking from such secret
agreements." Justice Jackson demanded a fuller explanation and demon-
strated with great elaboration the necessity and utility of resort to "the com-
mon law" to give content to federal law. "Were we bereft of the common law,
our federal system would be impotent." Later in the opinion, he stated clearly
a position similar to that taken in this paper.88 "No doubt many questions as
to the liability of parties to commercial paper which comes into the hands of
the [F.D.I.C.] will best be solved by applying the local law with reference to
which the makers and the insured bank presumably contracted .... But ...
[t]he policy of the Federal Act does not seem to me to leave dependent on
local law the question whether one may plead his own scheme to deceive a
bank's creditors and supervising authorities as against the Corporation."
Like Bernkrant v. Fowler,"9 the D'Oench Duhme case is one that suggests the
concurrence of a variety of fruitful approaches. It would have been a useful
occasion to explore the possibilities of a federal influence on harmonizing any
conflicting state policies in the case. Justice Frankfurter saw the problem and
stated, it seems most helpfully: "Whether the case is governed by the law of
one State or the other, or by 'federal common law' drawn here from one State
or the other, the result is the same." In my view, that should have been suffi-
cient, so long as it was understood that federal common law might well begin
with-and indeed should begin with-but need not end with, or be confined
67. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447, 465 (1942).
68. Id. at 470. In fairness, it should be noted that Justice Douglas, on several occasions in
which he nonetheless concluded that a federal-common-law rule supplanted any relevant state
law, conceded the utility of generous use of state law in giving content to the federal common
law. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 457
(1957) ("Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law.... But state law, if
compatible with the purpose of [the federal statutory provision], may be resorted to in order to
find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy .... Any state law applied, however, will
be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights."); Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
69. See text following note 5, supra.
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by, the laws of the two States. Even if the F.D.I.C.'s intervention in the trans-
action created no special problems requiring a distinct federal rule of substan-
tive law, multistate law with federal roots could have effected a choice of law
grounded in multistate protective policies that surely should have carried the
day as against any possible local policy to protect the accommodation maker.
70
That is to say, if local choice-of-law policy-contrary to Justice Frankfurter's
conclusion--did indicate a difficulty, multistate law could have been found
that would have overcome a contrary local policy. In this commercial context,
an undifferentiated federal policy to harmonize and make uniform the laws
of the several states could have been identified, although of course such a
policy is unlikely to be significant as to questions on which our federal system
encourages local diversity or is not prepared to impose uniformity in the face
of strongly-held local views.
Only if examination of the potential of multistate law proved fruitless
would the Court have then come to the question whether the presence of the
F.D.I.C. created a new consideration. If it clearly did, a separate federal
common law, as enunciated by the Court, would be indicated. It seems to me
doubtful that it was necessary to embark on the creation of a new body of
law; certainly analogues to the position of the holder in due course would
have been discoverable, and use of such analogues would have been better
judicial statesmanship.
What, however, is more important in this part of the discussion is the
proposition that at either step-recognition of a multistate law grounded in
federal common law or formulation of a federal common law rule-it would
have been sufficient (and therefore in my view no more was appropriate) to
formulate the resulting multistate law or federal common law rule in terms of
a floor of protection for the F.D.I.C. below which state law would not be
allowed to descend.
Doubtless many other situations can be analyzed in the same way. Perhaps
it is enough, however, to conclude with the observation that this approach is
one that the Supreme Court has in fact taken, although it may have done so,
as Professor Gilmore has observed of early stages of this phenomenon, "al-
most unconsciously."' 7' In the Sabbatino case,72 the Court held that federal
common law (here clearly a law involving or at least impinging on choice of
law73) functioned to preclude overly extensive inquiry by state courts into the
70. Certainly if Missouri law came into play only because, upon a failure of proof of Illinois
law, Missouri courts would presume the Illinois law to be the same as that of Missouri, only a
minimal multistate policy would have been needed to prevail over this Missouri choice-of-law
rule. See 315 U.S. at 455.
71. See Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1046 (1961), quoted in
Friendly, supra note 29, at 421.
72. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
73. See Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
805, 809-811 (1964).
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validity of acts of a foreign state. That this federal common law or multistate
law might be only a boundary rather than a rule with more contours was
clearly suggested, however: "We need not now consider whether a state court
might, in certain circumstances, adhere to a more restrictive view concerning
the scope of examination of foreign acts than that required by this Court.
74
Surely there is here the seed of an enormously useful device for making
the federal system more workable. The focus on sources of law-making au-
thority that led to Erie and to Southern Pacific v. Jensen75 were useful in help-
ing us sort out the problems. But obsession with sources of power misled us
into thinking that power was a touchstone for appropriateness. One need not
repudiate Erie andJensen to ask that the focus shift to appropriateness, with a
proper bias against federal law unless it is needed. With that new focus, there
should be a better prospect for realizing Judge Friendly's beautifully simple
and simply beautiful conception of the interworkings of federal and state law.
CONCLUSION
Although the foregoing is intended as a tentative statement, a number of
perhaps novel and doubtless controversial premises are involved; with some
tredipation, I venture to summarize.
In what I have called horizontal choice of law, we have traditionally begun
with "conflicts" among the laws of the states without regard to the general
legal climate to which we all nevertheless naturally have reference in our
thinking. It is far more natural, I think, for judges and lawyers to make a first
approximation to solution of a legal problem on the basis of general
learning 76 and then, in probing into a problem, to try to determine whether
74. 376 U.S. at 425 n.23.
75. 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (striking down state-court application of state law, in that it "work[ed]
material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or intertere[dJ with
the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations").
Despite regrettable recitals that the United States was not a party and that the suit was in
diversity, the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Miree v. DeKalb County, Ga., 97 S. Ct.
2490 (1977), placed major emphasis on the language in Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,
384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) ("In deciding whether rules of federal common law should be fashioned,
normally the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest
and the use of state law in the premises must first be specifically shown."). This language states a
sound test which, together with the Court's clear examination of the content of federal and state
law to ascertain whether sufficient interests existed, should provide a firm basis for future de-
velopment of federal common law. At the same time, it is to be hoped that discussion of whether
the United States is a party, of the basis of jurisdiction, and of the impact on the federal
treasury-itself clearly a matter for Congress and not for a court doing justice between individual
parties, cf. Unted States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947)-will soon disap-
pear from the judicial literature on federal common law.
76. Cf. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 27-28 (Tent. Ed. 1958):
. .. [T]he courts of the different states draw upon a common pool of ideas in the
decision of cases-except to the extent that their own legislature has directed or their
own past decisions require a distinctive mode of disposition. This pool of ideas was, in
the first instance, largely although not exclusively an inheritance from England. Putting
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in the particular case there are special factors commanding a different so-
lution.
Intellectual support for this "natural" approach can be found in two de-
velopments, both of which are examined in this paper: first, the emergence in
horizontal choice of law of mechanisms for subordinating domestic-law poli-
cies--through moderate and restrained interpretation of domestic rules or
more candidly through such approaches as the recognition of multistate
policies or the development of principles of preference; and, second, the con-
current growth, especially in response to Erie, of federal common law. A diffi-
culty with federal common law is that it is still very much in the formative
stage; the Supreme Court has not adequately addressed the question of creat-
ing a general framework for its development. 77 It has therefore seemed
necessary to make some suggestions about such a framework. It is my position
that if those suggestions are found acceptable and if horizontal choice of law
comes to be seen as an aspect of federal common law within that suggested
framework, much of the current unease in American choice of law might be
alleviated.
As I have argued, I think federal common law should develop only in
response to identified federal needs not adequately served by state law. In-
deed, federal common law can, I think, often take the form simply of limits
or boundaries on state law. If such a conception of federal common law is
accepted, then I think that horizontal choice of law is an eminently appro-
priate area to be included within the scope of federal common law. The chief
consequence, as I see it, would be to free state judges from local rules that
capriciously interfere with multistate transactions and to provide state and
federal judges alike with an intellectually congenial way of approaching multi-
state problems.
It is true that, quite properly, federal common law has been held to be
within the "arising under" or "federal-question" jurisdiction of the federal
courts.78 Choice of law should be no exception, and although a federal com-
mon law of choice of law might aggravate whatever problems there are with
the appellate case load of the Supreme Court, it is unlikely to add substan-
tially to the business of the lower federal courts. That would be so particularly
aside the special case of Louisiana, American courts all looked predominantly to the
English common law, or to so much of it as they believed to be adaptable to American
conditions, in shaping their own decisional rules. Over the years, of course, the rules of
the courts in different states have developed many points of divergence. But the com-
mon pool of ideas has been maintained and refreshed by the teaching of law schools, by
the writings of legal scholars, and by cogent opinions of able judges which have won
acceptance in courts of other states. This common pool constitutes always a powerful
force for homogeneity of legal thought in opposition to the many forces making for
heterogeneity.
77. See, however, note 75 supra.
78. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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if it develops as I suggest it should, interstitially and as a check on state
choice of law rather than as the normal foundation of a plaintiff's claim aris-
ing under federal law,7 9 and if, as I contemplate, this kind of federal common
law enjoys far wider application and development by state courts, with
guidance at times by the Supreme Court, than has perhaps in general been
the case with federal common law.
If these suggestions are accepted, I think we might see choice of law
within the United States as a much more manageable and much less esoteric
matter than it has at times seemed to be. Judges and lawyers would ask them-
selves, first, whether there exists a normal or usual way of dealing with a
legal problem, informed as we all hope to be by comparative investigation of
the law in the legal world to which our states belong. Only after some tenta-
tive view was reached, as I suppose judges and lawyers probably do regardless
of what the conflicts scholars say, would it then be open to consider the
nuances of the particular case. At that point, the existence in some state of a
strong and relevant policy that warranted departure from the normal or
usual rule would be considered. To a large extent, the only significant con-
tribution of federal common law to this process would be to free state-court
judges from any compulsions they .might otherwise find in local law to prefer
local law or local residents and to provide them with the intellectual equip-
ment needed to justify assessment of the strength of local policy and of the
policy of other concerned jurisdictions. Thus, what is contributed by federal
common law is essentially an attitude of neutrality and authority to view mul-
tistate problems from the perspective of the overarching federal order. That
very limited contribution should be sufficient, I think, for removing parochial
perspectives that create an illusion of true conflict when on further unfettered
analysis a false conflict should be found to exist. That is what I believe Justice
Traynor demonstrated in his own fashion in Bernkrant and what Judge Fuld
could well have done, albeit reaching the contrary result, in Neumeier.
For situations not in this way reducible to false conflicts, the contribution
of federal common law could be more pervasive. For example, as already
suggested, 0 for planned transactions the normal approach would doubtless
be one of validation, to give effect to the transaction, unless-and that would
be the decisive issue, a manageable and understandable one-a protective or
79. To whatever extent my suggestion would add to the business of the lower courts, already
seriously burdened, I can only hope that my approach would further stimulate re-examination of
their business. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973) (urging
drastic surgery through a wide array of proposals too numerous to summarize here; among
them, however, are severe limitation of the diversity jurisdiction and non-judicial alternatives for
F.E.L.A. and Jones Act cases). To the extent that my suggestion of a very limited and truly
interstitial federal common law would add to difficulty in deciding whether cases "arise" under
state or federal law, I can only say that that is a question that deserves reconsideration. See note
62 supra. See also VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 1, at 1019, 1054-1058, and note 66 supra.
80. See part V supra.
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other invalidating rule of some concerned jurisdiction ought to be applied.
This issue is to be considered from the perspective of, and with authority
from, the federal community and not from the local perspectives afforded by
the particular concerned states. Thus, in Milliken v. Pratt,"t pitting a Mas-
sachusetts policy to protect married women against policies supporting the
security of transactions, a much more complete federal-common-law rule
could develop. That rule, while allowing for recognition of a currently vital
Massachusetts protective policy, would enable the Massachusetts court-as it
did, much to its credit, without any such doctrinal assistance 2-2to stand back,
as it were, and ask about the current strength of the Massachusetts policy as
against the multijurisdictional concerns of Massachusetts (and Maine) and the
concerns of Maine. To the extent that the emerging choice-of-law rule was
contrary to a particular state's choice-of-law rule, it would displace that state
rule by force of federal authority or, preferably, would provide federal-
common-law limits on that state rule.8 3
In tort, the operative issue would be whether normal policies of compensa-
tion and loss-spreading should be interfered with by such recovery-denying
rules as guest statutes, charitable immunity, interspousal immunity, and limi-
tation on the amount of recovery for wrongful death-as to all of which I
think it is possible to make quite objective determinations, in most states at
least, whether the policies underlying such rules have current strength ade-
quate to justify their application to multistate cases. In any event, local at-
titudes against such inquiries would not be decisive.
As I have tried to explain, but doubtless will need to elaborate as our
thinking and experience grow, federal common law is an analytically sound
and intellectually satisfying basis for such developments in American choice of
law. How we deal with international choice of law remains a problem, a
somewhat different one. Although justification for the extension of federal
81. See note 11 supra.
82. See 125 Mass. 374 at 382-383:
In the great majority of cases, especially in this country, where it is so common to travel,
or to transact business through agents, or to correspond by letter, from one state to
another, it is more just, as well as more convenient, to have regard to the law of the
place of the contract, as a uniform rule operating on all contracts of the same kind, and
which the contracting parties may be presumed to have in contemplation when making
their contracts, than to require them at their peril to know the domicil of those with
whom they deal, and to ascertain the law of that domicil, however remote, which in
many cases could not be done without such delay as would greatly cripple the power of
contracting abroad at all.
83. Thus, for example, a federal choice-of-law rule might emerge-functioning, however, as a
limit or boundary on the permissible state choice-of-law rules-under which a state with a cur-
rently vital policy to protect a person engaged in a multistate transaction would nevertheless be
precluded from asserting its policy, particularly if to do so would unfairly surprise a person in a
jurisdiction with relevant and strong countervailing concerns to protect the intregrity of transac-
tions. For another example of the kind of federal rule that might emerge, compare VON MEHREN &
TRAUTMAN, supra note 1, at 217-218.
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choice of law to international choice of law is perhaps clearer 4-and indeed it
may already have happenedS8 5-the greater dissimilarity in the law and institu-
tional premises usually found in international cases, and the absence of cen-
tral authority, will often make it impossible to establish for that legal world
that a normal or usual rule exists from which justification for departure is
to be demonstrated. Be that as it may, I think there may be a number of
areas in which there is sufficient consensus on substantive-law issues that we
need not be totally unwilling on occasion to attempt a comparable approach
in international cases.
84. See note 44 supra.
85. See Henkin, supra note 73, and text at note 72 supra.
